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Judgment aggregation theory investigates which procedures a group could or should 
use to form collective judgments (‘yes’ or ‘no’) on a given set of propositions or issues, 
based on the judgments of the group members. How, for instance, should the citizens of 
a state reach collective judgments on the three propositions that multiculturalism is 
desirable, that immigration should be promoted, and that the former implies the latter? 
And how should a jury in court form collective judgments on the propositions that the 
defendant has broken the contract, that this contract was legally valid, and that the 
defendant is liable to pay damages? 
The discursive dilemma and political philosophy 
Such collective decision problems are vulnerable to the discursive dilemma, a 
phenomenon generalizing the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. The source of the 
dilemma is that the propositions under consideration are logically interconnected. In 
our first example, the third proposition is a conditional involving the first two 
propositions; and in our second example, the third proposition is equivalent to the 
conjunction of the first two propositions (according to the generally acknowledged 
legal doctrine that breach of a valid contract is necessary and sufficient for liability). 
The initially most natural and democratically appealing procedure – proposition-wise 
majority voting – may generate inconsistent collective judgments. In the case of our 
first example, Table 1 illustrates a situation in which the population is split into three 
camps such that, overall, a majority believes that multiculturalism is desirable 
(proposition P), another majority believes that if multiculturalism is desirable then 
immigration should be promoted (proposition if-P-then-Q), but yet another majority 
believes that immigration should not be promoted. 
 
 P If-P-then-Q Q 
1/3 of the population Yes Yes Yes 
1/3 of the population Yes No No 
1/3 of the population No Yes No 
The majority Yes Yes No 
Table 1: Inconsistent majority judgments 
 This phenomenon of majoritarian inconsistencies poses a serious challenge to the very 
meaning and possibility of democracy, since it seems that collective judgments cannot 
be both consistent and democratically responsive to people’s judgments. 
To restore collective rationality, two routes are often contrasted. Under the premise-
based route, the collective adopts the majority-supported judgments P and if-P-then-Q 
(interpreted as two premises), from which it derives the judgment Q (interpreted as a 
conclusion). Under the conclusion-based route, the collective instead adopts the 
majority-supported judgment not-Q, and either forms no judgments at all on the 
premise propositions, or forms some judgments on them which are logically consistent 
with not-Q, such as the judgments not-P and if-P-then-Q. In short, the premise-based 
approach respects majorities on premises while overruling majorities on conclusions, 
while the conclusion-based approach does the converse. 
In response to the discursive dilemma, a highly interdisciplinary body of research has 
developed, conducted mainly by economists, philosophers, political scientists and 
computer scientists. The less formal branch of research has its home in political 
philosophy. It focuses on the nature and role of the collective agent and the extent to 
which such an agent should provide reasons (premises) for its policies (conclusions). 
As is sometimes argued from the perspective of republican democratic theory, the state 
must act upon and publicly provide reasons in order for its actions to be contestable. 
Contestability of state actions is in turn important for preventing arbitrary state 
interference in citizen’s lives, i.e., to render citizens free in the republican sense. The 
need for reason-based state actions or policies is often taken to imply the superiority of 
premise-based over conclusion-based aggregation. 
The formal theory of judgment aggregation 
The more formal area of research stands in the tradition of Arrovian social choice 
theory. The judgment aggregation problem is formulated in full abstract generality. 
Two central ingredients of the theory are, firstly, the group’s agenda, i.e., the set of 
propositions on which judgments are formed; and secondly, the notion of an 
aggregation rule or procedure, i.e., a function which takes each person’s set of 
judgments as input and returns a collective set of judgments. Simple examples of 
aggregation rules are proposition-wise majority rule, proposition-wise quota rules (with 
acceptance thresholds that may differ from the majority threshold and may vary across 
propositions), premise-based voting, conclusion-based voting, and the ‘expert rule’ 
which universally adopts the judgments of a fixed individual (the ‘expert’ or ‘dictator’). 
The generality of the framework stems from the fact that virtually any kind of decision 
can be construed as the formation of judgments on particular propositions. Notably, the 
classical preference aggregation problem in social choice theory emerges a special case, 
because a preference relation can be construed as a set of judgments on propositions of 
the form ‘x is better than y’, where x and y denote choice alternatives. 
The axiomatic approach 
Within judgment aggregation theory, one may broadly distinguish between an 
axiomatic and a constructive approach, the two of which go hand in hand. The 
axiomatic approach starts by formulating general requirements (‘axioms’) on 
aggregation rules which capture normative principles or intuitions. An example of an 
axiom of procedural fairness is anonymity, which forbids differential treatment of 
voters, i.e., requires that the collective judgment set only depends on the number of 
individuals holding each given judgment set, regardless of their identity. This axiom for 
instance excludes the mentioned expert rule. The axiom of consistency of collective 
judgment sets excludes proposition-wise majority rule, as the discursive dilemma 
shows. Once a set of axioms is specified, one proceeds by determining all judgment 
aggregation rules satisfying the axioms, a more or less difficult mathematical exercise. 
Ideally, there is a single such rule, but often there are many rules (leaving a choice to be 
made) or no rules (forcing one to abandon an axiom). Indeed, in a series of 
impossibility theorems, it has been established that various combinations of axioms are 
not satisfied by any aggregation rule if the agenda of propositions is sufficiently 
complex. Many of these theorems are in a similar spirit as Kenneth Arrow’s famous 
impossibility theorem in preference aggregation theory. Indeed, one of them stands out 
as being an exact generalization of Arrow’s theorem from preference aggregation 
problems to arbitrary judgment aggregation problems. A quite different impossibility 
theorem generalizes Amarya Sen’s influential ‘Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’; it 
brings to light a conflict between respecting unanimous judgments and respecting the 
right of individuals or minorities to alone determine the collective judgment on 
propositions within the private sphere or the area of special competence. 
The constructive approach 
This approach tries directly to devise concrete aggregation rules for reaching consistent 
and democratically responsive collective judgments, without a preceding axiomatic 
derivation. The following salient proposals or paradigms can be contrasted: (i) premise- 
or conclusion-based aggregation rules; (ii) quota rules with well-calibrated acceptance 
thresholds; (iii) sequential rules, where the propositions in the agenda are voted upon 
one by one in an order of priority and where the vote on any proposition is suspended if 
the previous voting outcomes on propositions of higher priority already imply a 
judgment (‘yes’ or ‘no’) on the current propositions; (iv) distance-based rules, where 
the collective adopts a consistent set of judgments whose sum-total distance to people’s 
sets of judgments is as small as possible, with respect to some distance measure 
between judgment sets; (v) scoring rules, where the collective adopts a consistent set of 
judgments which receives maximal sum-total score from the individuals, with respect 
to some definition of ‘scores’. 
Localistic versus holistic aggregation 
Under a localistic (or proposition-wise) understanding of democratic responsiveness, 
the collective judgment on any given proposition should be formed solely on the basis 
of people’s judgments on this proposition, independently of their judgments on other 
propositions. By contrast, under a holistic conception of democratic responsiveness, the 
collective judgment on, say, whether immigration should be promoted may be 
influenced by people’s judgments on other propositions, such as ‘premises’ or even 
unrelated propositions about taxation. Here, even an overwhelming majority judgment 
on whether immigration should be promoted may be overruled in the name of people’s 
judgments elsewhere. 
Localism is the content of the (controversial) independence axiom, the counterpart in 
judgment aggregation theory of the (equally controversial) axiom of ‘independence of 
irrelevant alternatives’ in preference aggregation theory. A virtue of independence is 
that it is necessary for preventing the manipulation of outcomes through certain types of 
strategic voting or strategic agenda setting, as was proved. However, independence 
features as the central axiom in most impossibility theorems. Hence, the goal of 
aggregating localistically is unachievable (for agendas subject to the impossibility 
result) – whether or not localism is normatively desirable.  
The procedural versus the epistemic approach 
Two contrasting approaches or aims may be pursued when designing the aggregation 
rule. The procedural approach aims for a ‘procedurally fair’ rule; for instance, 
anonymity is usually a central procedural virtue. The epistemic approach aims for a rule 
which generates ‘correct’ or ‘true’ collective judgments by an external, procedure-
independent standard of correctness or truth; here, anonymity may be violated in the 
name of differences in information or competence. While most of the literature has a 
proceduralist flavour, some work takes the epistemic perspective and stands in the 
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